By Nicholas DeMasters.
Will Deploying the U.S. Military Stop the Mexican Cartels Fentanyl Enterprise: Exploring Strategies and Evaluating Options
In recent polling, 25% of Americans report that either themselves or a family member have been addicted to opioids. [i] Unfortunately, within the current US political landscape, there is less agreement on policy solutions that are urgently needed to address the widespread opioid crisis endangering so many Americans. [ii] A fundamental shift in policy paradigm is imperative to address the persistent failure of US policies in combating the escalation of fentanyl deaths and the ever-expanding drug enterprise of Mexican cartels. [iii]
The statistics illustrate these continued failures clearly. In 2023 alone, the Center for Disease Control tracked over 110,000 Americans died from Fentanyl overdoses [iv] and the Department of Homeland Security has estimated that between $19 and $29 billion was made by the Mexican cartels in illicit drug trade. [v] This crisis requires a fundamental recalibration, and the US military may offer a plausible alternative.
Beyond being the world’s most lethal fighting force, the military embodies an assortment of capabilities, that strategically positioned, could offer ways to diminish the expansive drug network of the cartels. Through failed cooperative efforts with the Mexican government, particularly in addressing the fentanyl supply chain, the US military must leverage its capabilities and establish a multifaceted defense strategy aimed at disrupting cartel activities. Initially, by securing maritime shipping routes originating from mainland China, where precursor chemicals crucial for fentanyl production are trafficked, the military can impede the primary source of cartel resources. The next layer would be within the coastal waters of North America where Northern Command can deploy a variety of capabilities and technologies to further intercept these precursor shipments before they reach cartel-controlled ports of entry.
Furthermore, the military could be used in its most obvious form through direct action operations to dismantle key nodes in the cartel’s supply chain by employing special forces and precision targeting drones. This comprehensive strategy highlights the potential for the US military to significantly disrupt cartel activities and mitigate the fentanyl crisis.
The military arsenal surpasses the confines of mere lethality, resembling a versatile Swiss Army knife adept at navigating the intricate challenges of the cartels. Emphasizing the multifaceted nature of the American armed forces becomes crucial, underscoring their capacity to surpass a singular role and evolve into a formidable force multiplier to protecting the homeland. Alarming statistics necessitates the immediate demand for military action.
Recently, the Drug Enforcement Agency (DEA) lead administrator stated that the leading cause of death for Americans age 18-45 is fentanyl overdose. [vi] The DEA also labeled both the Sinaloa Cartel and Jalisco Cartel in Mexico as primarily responsible for the vast majority of fentanyl trafficked in the United States. [vii] That coupled with the Mexican government’s deliberate acquiescence to the cartel’s illicit drug activity [viii] and Congress’s inability to generate any effective legislative measures [ix] make the use of military action more palatable against the malign impact coming from the Mexican cartels. These organizations represent a clear and present danger, threatening US national security and more importantly, safety of countless American lives. Although typically viewed as the hammer, the U.S. military has an inordinate amount of capabilities at its disposal that can help counter the cartel’s enterprise and further eliminate their manufacturing and distribution operations into the United States.
How Did We Get Here: Mexico’s Political Landscape
Since his 2018 landslide presidential victory and contrary to his predecessors, President Andres Manuel López Obrador (commonly referred to as AMLO) has pledged a non-confrontational approach to the cartels, advocating “hugs not bullets” and vowing to withdraw the Mexican military from the streets. [x] However, contrary to his assurances, the violence has exploded in Mexico, with over 30,000 deaths annually and more than 40,000 reported missing during his presidential tenure. [xi]
In contrast to the mass migration driven by the pursuit of employment in the US a decade earlier, Mexican immigrants are now fleeing to the United States to escape the escalating tyrannical violence perpetrated by cartels. [xii] Since taking office, AMLO has actively worked to dismantle the Merida Initiative, a $3 billion US-Mexico security cooperation framework established during the administrations of Mexican President Felipe Calderón and US President George W. Bush. In 2021, Mexico officially terminated the initiative, signaling an intentional shift away from security cooperation efforts to counter violent transnational organized crime in Mexico. [xiii] Despite discussions led by the U.S. to renegotiate and reorient the Merida Initiative through joint security dialogs, collaboration against the Mexican cartels has shown minimal improvement.
Mexico’s reluctance to implement more effective counter-cartel policies is worsened by AMLO’s contradictory approach of militarizing public security while exploiting Mexico’s Armed Forces as low-cost labor for the MORENA party. Employing a political maneuver, AMLO successfully disbanded Mexico’s Federal Police under civilian leadership, and reincorporated more than 77% of its former members into a new National Guard overseen by an increasingly partisan defense ministry. Meanwhile, the Mexican military is progressively shifting away from security roles, involving itself in civilian infrastructure projects without adequate anticorruption measures or tender requirements. This includes taking charge of significant infrastructure endeavors such as Felipe Ángeles International Airport, expanding into tourism such as the Mayan Train project, and managing points of entry. [xiv] According to El Centro de Investigación y Docencia Económicas, over 246 civilian institutions have been transferred to the Mexican Armed Forces since 2006, signaling a substantial departure from its traditional security role within the country. [xv]
These are all indications that AMLO is using the military for everything but countering cartel criminal efforts and the prospect for cooperations between the two countries on how to handle the cartels is bleak. To further compound that outlook, the upcoming 2024 Mexican presidential candidate and close ally to AMLO, Claudia Sheinbaum, is of the same mindset when it comes to working with and not against these violent criminal organizations. Sheinbaum is poised to win the upcoming 2024 presidential elections and is set to uphold AMLO’s legacy while advancing the political agenda of the MORENA party. [xvi]
This should be a serious cause for concern for US policymakers, as her leadership is likely to worsen Mexico’s security posture, leading to heightened exposure of Mexicans to cartel violence and an inadvertent increase in fentanyl overdoses among Americans. [xvii] The current trajectory suggests a reluctance by Mexico to adopt more effective counter-cartel domestic policies in the near future or even cooperative policies with AMLO as he intends to continue to role of acquiescence to these criminal enterprises. [xviii] All evidence conclusively showing Mexico’s ongoing struggle to manage the escalating cartel violence domestically shows the urgency for the United States military to take action if there is any hope to stop the opioid casualties. [xix] Given the limited progress in U.S.-Mexico security cooperation and Mexico’s hesitancy to adopt more effective counter-cartel policies, it becomes increasingly evident that the full spectrum of capabilities from the United States military is necessary and presents a critical policy alternative for effectively counteracting of the escalating cartel threat.
Who Holds the Key: Unlocking Solutions to Disrupt the Fentanyl Supply Chain
In 2019, China emerged as the primary manufacturer and distributor of illicit fentanyl bound for the US. [xx] However, by 2023, the Mexican cartels had overtaken China, seizing control of the illicit drug market and revolutionizing its sourcing model. [xxi] They now dominate the production of illicit fentanyl consumed in America, utilizing chemical precursors from a various Chinese-affiliated companies. [xxii] This shift has transformed the cartels roles from full-scale operations to sole supplier of the world’s largest consumer market. [xxiii] The geopolitical landscape has further complicated the fentanyl crisis, with deteriorating U.S.-China relations exacerbating the sourcing problem for the United States government. This was evident when China formally suspended cooperation with the United States in any counter drug effort in August 2022. Subsequently, the US Department of Treasury sanctioned over forty Chinese nationals linked to fentanyl trafficking, and the Department of Justice arrested two Chinese nationals involved in a fentanyl trafficking scheme. Despite these efforts, merely identifying and sanctioning criminal organizations is insufficient. [xxiv]
Additionally, reliance on the Mexican government to disrupt the fentanyl distribution has been futile. In 2022 the Mexican Congress finally mandated authorities to intercept fentanyl precursor chemicals at the various Mexican maritime ports, such as the port of Manzanillo where there are approximately 3.5 million shipping containers passing through annually. [xxv] In 2023, the Mexican Navy disclosed that they work without technical assistance from the US to search the millions of shipping containers. [xxvi] This lack of cooperation is compounded by the challenges posed by the Mexican cartels, which perpetuate an environment of violence and intimidation. Exemplified in May 2023, when Sergio Emmanuel Martinez, newly appointed deputy customs director in Manzanillo, fell victim to an assassination weeks after assuming the role. [xxvii] This collaboration between Chinese chemical companies and Mexican cartels underpins the significant challenges of the maritime smuggling routes for these illicit fentanyl precursors. [xxviii]
Early maritime interdiction can address the root of the supply problem. By disrupting the early part of the cartel supply chain, the U.S. military can prevent fentanyl precursors from reaching the maritime ports across North America, where the cartel clandestine labs and manufacturing hubs exist. [xxix] Such military action requires high reliance on the US intelligence community, effective intergovernmental agency cooperation, and a command infrastructure capable of managing a large area of operations. To effectively execute maritime interdiction operations against these Chinese affiliated companies and their transports, the Department of Defense (DoD) must prioritize this mission effort under U.S. Pacific Command (PACOM).
However, despite possessing the necessary command and control framework, the established task force for this purpose, Joint Interagency Task Force West (JIATF West), has been significantly gutted, rendering it more of a rhetorical reference rather than an operationally capable unit. JIATF West, designated as the PACOM executive agent for DoD in counter-drug (CD) and drug-related missions, has encountered challenges since its establishment in 2003. Eventually, the Defense Wide Review, despite a directive for its deactivation in January 2020, was later reversed in 2021 with the approval to retain it as a smaller organization. It is imperative for the US military to revitalize and rejuvenate JIATF West as a primary PACOM function, with a renewed emphasis on its role as the first line of defense in countering the fentanyl crisis at America’s front door. [xxx]
What are Other Military capabilities: A Layered Border Defense Structure
With PACOM responsible for monitoring and intercepting the outer most layer of illicit drug sourcing, the next line of defense falls to Northern Command (NORTHCOM). Within NORTHCOM, Joint Task Force North (JTF-N) is designated as the lead DoD command to support interagency CD operations against the cartel threats to the homeland. [xxxi]
However, JTF-N has its own assorted challenges that could be compromising its mission readiness. JTF-N may not be sufficiently manned. Another concern is that it is composed of National Guard troops from many different units, which could impact on its ability to operate cohesively. There have been past news reports that the mission overseen by JTF-N, known as Task Force Phoenix, has been plagued by systemic issues such as alcohol and drug abuse among troops. These issues likely exacerbate management and operational challenges arising from an ad hoc organizational structure.
Despite Congressional oversight, neither NORTHCOM nor DoD have disclosed the recent findings of an internal administrative investigation initiated in response to these clear military readiness concerns, leaving critical questions unanswered about troop readiness, operational efficacy, command climate underpinning a lack of military effectiveness at countering the fentanyl distribution by the Mexican cartels. [xxxii]
Even with those setbacks working against JTF-N, NORTHCOM should request further surveillance capability from other overseas military units through DoD’s global force management system. Additional arial and maritime drone capability would provide JTF-N enhanced detection of fentanyl and fentanyl precursor shipments, as well as the ability to track suspicious activity by the Mexican cartels. NORTHCOM is also in the process to modernize the North Warning System, incorporating autonomous platforms equipped with domain awareness sensors that could provide continuous monitoring of potential threats. Additionally, NORTHCOM is enhancing over-the-horizon radar systems aimed to bolster threat awareness that could enhance coastal monitoring and increase effectiveness of interdiction operations. This lack of military cohesion and effectiveness overlayed with technological capability need highlights JTF-N unit overhaul and need for a comprehensive approach to effectively neutralize the cartel’s threat in the next layered defense. [xxxiii]
Furthermore, JTF-N should prioritize efforts to seize weapons being trafficked to Mexican cartels by Americans, in coordination with Alcohol Tobacco and Firearms (ATF). The arming of these violent syndicates and influx of weapons has only strengthened the grip of the cartels over the Mexican police forces and military. While Bipartisan Safer Communities Act has been passed, boasting the seizure of approximately 2,000 firearms, it pales in comparison to the estimated 200,000 firearms smuggled into Mexico annually. Prioritizing interagency efforts by JTF-N underscores the urgent need for concerted military intelligence efforts to prevent cartels from acquiring sophisticated, military-grade weapons. [xxxiv]
A Lethal Approach: Strategic Employment of Kinetic Strikes in Combating Fentanyl Distribution by Mexican Cartels
Finally, the US military can assume its primary role and utilize kinetic strikes in various ways to confront the Mexican cartel threat, aiming to isolate and eliminate fentanyl distribution in the final stages of the supply chain. The US military has a proven track record of success, exemplified by the effective use of Special Forces and precision strikes in previous operations, such as those against ISIS. While the operational and strategic context may differ, the military tactics have demonstrated their capability to minimize civilian casualties and maximize target neutralization. [xxxv] Moreover, the recognition of the decades of ineffective U.S. policy strategies involving the DEA and Mexican military emphasizes the need for a paradigm shift in military intervention. The DEA lacks the necessary funding and are not resourced for such operations due to its lack of manpower and necessary equipment for large-scale operations to combat the sophisticated and well-armed cartel networks that are insulated by either corrupt or apathetic institutions. [xxxvi]
In contrast, the military has the operational reach, capabilities, and manpower needed to address these challenges utilizing weapon systems for intelligence gathering and precision strikes, as well as deploying Special Operations Forces for targeted strikes against cartel hubs and infrastructure. These proposed military operations draw parallels with counterterrorism tactics employed in the Middle East for decades, building upon the muscle memory of garnered experience and further showcasing military efficiency in combating complex threats. [xxxvii]
The usage of kinetic military options to combat drug trafficking poses inherent risks that extend beyond the immediate tactical considerations. The militarization of drug enforcement efforts could lead to the proliferation of more potent and hazardous substances as cartels adapt to heightened US military enforcement measures. Moreover, such approaches entail significant geopolitical and economic implications. AMLO’s criticism of proposals for US military intervention emphasizes the potential for strained US-Mexico relations. [xxxviii] In 2022 alone, trade between the two countries equaled more than three-quarters of a trillion dollars [xxxix] The lack of cooperation from Mexico, could further exacerbate diplomatic efforts and hinder effective collaboration on shared security concerns. Furthermore, US military operations may lead to the displacement of drug trafficking activities to neighboring Central American countries, highlighting the intricate and transnational nature of the Mexican cartel drug enterprise. [xl]
An innovative strategy to render the kinetic military option more palatable to the Mexican government and amplify its deterrent effect involves a selective approach in targeting the most volatile cartel syndicate, such as the Jalisco Cartel. [xli] According to the DEA, the Jalisco Cartel are primarily responsible for the vast majority of the fentanyl that is being trafficked to the United States. Not only that, the Jalisco Cartel are trafficking fentanyl combined with xylazine, a potent veterinary sedative that intensifies the risk of fatal drug poisoning, and more importantly is resistant to NARCAN to counteract xylazine’s effects. [xlii]
By concentrating efforts on disrupting the operations of one particular syndicate, two enduring consequences can be anticipated. Firstly, the demonstration of military efficacy in dismantling a formidable cartel would serve to instill a sense of apprehension among other cartel factions, conveying a message that similar actions could be replicated against them if deemed necessary by the US military and government. Second, this display of force could serve as a potent deterrent, compelling other cartels to reconsider their involvement in the production and trafficking of opioids destined for the United States.
Such targeted interventions, therefore, have the potential to embody a significant shift in the calculus of cartel behavior and contribute to the broader objective of reducing US fentanyl-related deaths. [xliii] Overall, leveraging US military lethality, including weapon systems and Special Forces, presents a promising strategy to disrupt the extensive cartel networks and safeguard American lives. This represents a departure from previous failed, non-existent policies and offers the potential for successful implementation of long-range, precision operations. [xliv]
Assessing the Effectiveness of Military Action Against Mexican Cartel Drug Trafficking: A Critical Review
In confronting the dire opioid crisis fueled by the expanding reach of Mexican cartels, a paradigm shift and recalibration of US policy is imperative. While the US government develops a complex strategy to implement effective military involvement in the countering of Mexican Cartels and utilize the US military to strike the Mexican cartel leadership and networks directly as a means to address this pressing issue, such actions necessitate an examination of existing legal precedent and authorities. The suggestion arises that expanding these existing frameworks may hold greater relevance than designating the cartels as terrorist organizations. Despite the advantages offered by the official designation of terrorists, including streamlined prosecution for material support and asset freezes, it is important to recognize that drug trafficking is already a serious offense under US federal law and the DoD already have existing authorities and funding to counter transnational criminal organizations. [xlv] Title 10 U.S.C. 284 grants the DoD the authority to provide specified support for counterdrug activities and to counter transnational organized crime.
Despite ongoing debates over the use of the military for law enforcement functions and concerns regarding force deployment along the southern border, Title 10 U.S.C. 284 has been consistently reauthorized by Congress. For example, in the DoD budget of 2019, a total of $881.5 million was allocated for US military counterdrug funding with domestic counterdrug support missions coordinated by NORTHCOM and more specifically, JTF-N. Despite President Trump’s memorandum directing DoD to support Department of Homeland Security (DHS) efforts to secure the southern border, it was noted in congressional testimony that 10 U.S.C. 284 had not been utilized for this purpose. However, DOD expressed readiness to review and respond to any assistance requests from DHS under this authority. [xlvi]
Nevertheless, the United States maintains the legal framework designed to combat transnational criminal organizations and it remains uncertain whether affixing a designated terrorist label to the Mexican cartels would substantially enhance US legal authority for the US military intervention. Therefore, rather than altering their designation to foreign terrorist organizations, a more pragmatic approach would involve directly addressing specific Title 10 U.S.C 284 authority shortcomings through legislative means. [xlvii]
Amidst these legal considerations, the multifaceted capabilities of the US military emerge as a compelling option to confront the escalating threat posed by Mexican cartels and their fentanyl distribution networks. As the opioid epidemic continues to claim American lives at an alarming rate, the urgency for decisive action grows more pronounced. Given the clear and present danger that Mexican cartels pose to national security and public health, the military’s intervention becomes increasingly indispensable. However, with effective legislative measures restructured, leveraging the US military may indeed stand as the final line of defense against this formidable adversary to the homeland. Employing a defense in depth approach, the military’s extensive resources and strategic positioning offer a formidable deterrent solution against cartel operations and the influx of fentanyl overdoses plaguing the United States. Thus, recognizing the military’s potential as a force multiplier in protecting the homeland is not merely an alternative but a mandate in the fight against the opioid epidemic devastating American families.
*****
Author: Nicholas M. DeMasters is a US Naval Special Operations veteran with over 10 years of active duty time. Mr. DeMasters has deployed throughout Southeast Asia, the Middle East, Africa, and Europe. Mr. DeMasters has extensive military experience in interagency missions working with numerous foreign special operations units. Mr. DeMasters has his undergraduate degree from the US Naval Academy and was recently selected for a graduate fellowship at the Center of Public Leadership at Harvard University’s Kennedy School of Government where he is undergoing a Masters of Public Administration.
Image: Derived from a map of U.S. and Mexico border by the U.S. Environmental Protection Agency, 30 April 2011.
Endnotes:
[i] Owens. (2023, September 11). The politicization of the fentanyl crisis. Axios. Retrieved January 30, 2024, from https://www.axios.com/2023/09/11/fentanyl-politics-border-mexico
[ii] Ibid.
[iii] Ibid.
[iv] Mann, B. (2023, December 28). In 2023 fentanyl overdoses ravaged the U.S. and fueled a new culture war fight. NPR. https://www.npr.org/2023/12/28/1220881380/overdose-fentanyl-drugs-addiction#:~:text=In%202023%20the%20overdose%20death,for%20Disease%20Control%20and%20Prevention.
[v] Department of Homeland Security. (n.d.). The United States of America – Mexico Bi-National Criminal Proceeds Study. US Department of Homeland Security. Retrieved March 6, 2024, from https://www.ice.gov/doclib/cornerstone/pdf/cps-study.pdf
[vi] DEA Administrator on Record Fentanyl Overdose Deaths | Get Smart About Drugs. (n.d.). https://www.getsmartaboutdrugs.gov/media/dea-administrator-record-fentanyl-overdose-deaths
[vii] DEA Laboratory Testing Reveals that 6 out of 10 Fentanyl-Laced Fake Prescription Pills Now Contain a Potentially Lethal Dose of Fentanyl | DEA.gov. (n.d.). https://www.dea.gov/alert/dea-laboratory-testing-reveals-6-out-10-fentanyl-laced-fake-prescription-pills-now-contain
[viii] Lopez, O. (2023, May 31). Mexico’s president says he would support peace agreement with cartels. The Guardian. https://www.theguardian.com/world/2023/may/31/mexico-president-peace-agreement-cartels
[ix] Schiller, R. (2023, July 18). Opioid and Fentanyl Legislation Under Consideration in Congress - National League of Cities. National League of Cities. https://www.nlc.org/article/2023/07/14/opioid-and-fentanyl-legislation-under-consideration-in-congress/
[x] Lopez, O. (2023, May 31). Mexico’s president says he would support peace agreement with cartels. The Guardian. https://www.theguardian.com/world/2023/may/31/mexico-president-peace-agreement-cartels
[xi] Ibid.
[xii] Solomon. (2023, December 15). Insight: Rise in Mexican cartel violence drives record migration to the US. Reuters. Retrieved January 30, 2024, from https://www.reuters.com/world/americas/rise-mexican-cartel-violence-drives-record-migration-us-2023-12-15/#:~:text=Rivalries%20between%20organized%20crime%20groups,Mexican%20families%20in%20modern%20history.
[xiii] US-Mexico security collaboration won’t be easily resurrected | Brookings. (2022, March 9). Brookings. https://www.brookings.edu/articles/us-mexico-security-collaboration-wont-be-easily-resurrected/
[xiv] Monroy, Jorge. 2021. Review of Documentan El Traslado a Militares de 246 Tareas Civiles. El Economista. October 21, 2021. https://www.eleconomista.com.mx/politica/Documentan-el-traslado-a-militares-de-246-tareas-civiles-20211020-0155.html.
[xv] Monroy, Jorge. 2021. Review of Documentan El Traslado a Militares de 246 Tareas Civiles. El Economista. October 21, 2021. https://www.eleconomista.com.mx/politica/Documentan-el-traslado-a-militares-de-246-tareas-civiles-20211020-0155.html.
[xvi] Madry. (2023, October 24). Mexico’s Sheinbaum handily leads 2024 presidential race, poll shows. Reuters. Retrieved January 28, 2024, from https://www.reuters.com/world/americas/mexicos-sheinbaum-handily-leads-2024-presidential-race-poll-shows-2023-10-04/
[xvii] McCormick. (2023, November 1). Drug cartels are paying attention to U.S. and Mexico politics. Dallas Morning News. Retrieved January 28, 2024, from https://www.dallasnews.com/opinion/commentary/2023/11/01/drug-cartels-are-paying-attention-to-us-and-mexico-politics/
[xviii] US-Mexico security collaboration won’t be easily resurrected | Brookings. (2022, March 9). Brookings. https://www.brookings.edu/articles/us-mexico-security-collaboration-wont-be-easily-resurrected/
[xix] McCormick. (2023, November 1). Drug cartels are paying attention to U.S. and Mexico politics. Dallas Morning News. Retrieved January 28, 2024, from https://www.dallasnews.com/opinion/commentary/2023/11/01/drug-cartels-are-paying-attention-to-us-and-mexico-politics/
[xx] Congressional Research Service. (2023, September 28). China Primer: Illicit Fentanyl and China’s Role. CRS. Retrieved January 29, 2024, from https://crsreports.congress.gov/product/pdf/IF/IF10890
[xxi] Congressional Research Service. (2023, September 28). China Primer: Illicit Fentanyl and China’s Role. CRS. Retrieved January 29, 2024, from https://crsreports.congress.gov/product/pdf/IF/IF10890
[xxii] Congressional Research Service. (2023, September 28). China Primer: Illicit Fentanyl and China’s Role. CRS. Retrieved January 29, 2024, from https://crsreports.congress.gov/product/pdf/IF/IF10890
[xxiii] Congressional Research Service. (2023, September 28). China Primer: Illicit Fentanyl and China’s Role. CRS. Retrieved January 29, 2024, from https://crsreports.congress.gov/product/pdf/IF/IF10890
[xxiv] Congressional Research Service. (2023, September 28). China Primer: Illicit Fentanyl and China’s Role. CRS. Retrieved January 29, 2024, from https://crsreports.congress.gov/product/pdf/IF/IF10890
[xxv] F. (2023, July 25). Mexican port on the front line of US battle against fentanyl. France 24. https://www.france24.com/en/live-news/20230725-mexican-port-on-the-front-line-of-us-battle-against-fentanyl
[xxvi] F. (2023, July 25). Mexican port on the front line of US battle against fentanyl. France 24. https://www.france24.com/en/live-news/20230725-mexican-port-on-the-front-line-of-us-battle-against-fentanyl
[xxvii] F. (2023, July 25). Mexican port on the front line of US battle against fentanyl. France 24. https://www.france24.com/en/live-news/20230725-mexican-port-on-the-front-line-of-us-battle-against-fentanyl
[xxviii] F. (2023, July 25). Mexican port on the front line of US battle against fentanyl. France 24. https://www.france24.com/en/live-news/20230725-mexican-port-on-the-front-line-of-us-battle-against-fentanyl
[xxix] Davidson. (2021, March 9). STATEMENT OF ADMIRAL PHILIP S. DAVIDSON, U.S. NAVY COMMANDER, U.S. INDO-PACIFIC COMMAND BEFORE THE SENATE ARMED SERVICES COMMITTEE ON U.S. INDO-PACIFIC COMMAND POSTURE. Retrieved February 15, 2024, from https://www.armed-services.senate.gov/imo/media/doc/Davidson_03-09-21.pdf
[xxx] JIATFW. (n.d.). U.S. Indo-Pacific Command. https://www.pacom.mil/JIATFW.aspx
[xxxi] Joint Task Force North. (2017, March). NORTHCOM. Retrieved February 18, 2024, from https://www.jtfn.northcom.mil/Portals/16/documents/jtfn_trifold.pdf?ver=2017-08-04-112134-233#:~:text=JTF%2DN%20supports%20federal%20law,to%20protect%20the%20homeland%20and
[xxxii] Winkie, D. (2021, December 8). Death, drugs, and a disbanded unit: How the Guard’s Mexico border mission fell apart. Army Times. https://www.armytimes.com/news/your-army/2021/12/08/death-drugs-and-a-disbanded-unit-how-the-guards-mexico-border-mission-fell-apart/
[xxxiii] Judson, J. (2023, May 12). A new design for homeland defense is in the works at NORTHCOM. Defense News. https://www.defensenews.com/congress/2023/05/10/a-new-design-for-homeland-defense-is-in-the-works-at-northcom/
[xxxiv] New, B. (2023, October 7). The I-Team: Mexican drug cartels look to North Texas to smuggle military-grade guns. CBS News. https://www.cbsnews.com/texas/news/the-i-team-mexican-drug-cartels-look-to-north-texas-to-smuggle-military-grade-guns/
[xxxv] The War on Terror Playbook for Decimating Mexican Drug Cartels. (2024, January 25). Hudson. https://www.hudson.org/drug-policy/war-terror-playbook-decimating-mexican-drug-cartels-william-barr
[xxxvi] The War on Terror Playbook for Decimating Mexican Drug Cartels. (2024, January 25). Hudson. https://www.hudson.org/drug-policy/war-terror-playbook-decimating-mexican-drug-cartels-william-barr
[xxxvii] The War on Terror Playbook for Decimating Mexican Drug Cartels. (2024, January 25). Hudson. https://www.hudson.org/drug-policy/war-terror-playbook-decimating-mexican-drug-cartels-william-barr
[xxxviii] Carpenter. (2023, April 3). We Shouldn’t Use the Military to Fight Mexico’s Drug Cartels. CATO Institute. Retrieved March 6, 2024, from https://www.cato.org/commentary/we-shouldnt-use-military-fight-mexicos-drug-cartels
[xxxix] Jenkins, B. (2023, March 22). Should Mexico’s Drug Cartels Be Designated Foreign Terrorist Organizations? RAND. https://www.rand.org/pubs/commentary/2023/03/should-mexicos-drug-cartels-be-designated-foreign-terrorist.html
[xl] Carpenter. (2023, April 3). We Shouldn’t Use the Military to Fight Mexico’s Drug Cartels. CATO Institute. Retrieved March 6, 2024, from https://www.cato.org/commentary/we-shouldnt-use-military-fight-mexicos-drug-cartels
[xli] Dalby, C., & Dalby, C. (2023, October 13). How Mexico’s Cartels Have Learned Military Tactics. InSight Crime. https://insightcrime.org/news/how-mexicos-cartel-have-learned-military-tactics/
[xlii] DEA Reports Widespread Threat of Fentanyl Mixed with Xylazine | DEA.gov. (n.d.). https://www.dea.gov/alert/dea-reports-widespread-threat-fentanyl-mixed-xylazine
[xliii] Dalby, C., & Dalby, C. (2023, October 13). How Mexico’s Cartels Have Learned Military Tactics. InSight Crime. https://insightcrime.org/news/how-mexicos-cartel-have-learned-military-tactics/
[xliv] The War on Terror Playbook for Decimating Mexican Drug Cartels. (2024, January 25). Hudson. . https://www.hudson.org/drug-policy/war-terror-playbook-decimating-mexican-drug-cartels-william-barr
[xlv] Jenkins, B. (2023, March 22). Should Mexico’s Drug Cartels Be Designated Foreign Terrorist Organizations? RAND. https://www.rand.org/pubs/commentary/2023/03/should-mexicos-drug-cartels-be-designated-foreign-terrorist.html
[xlvi] Rosen, W. (2019, February 20). The Defense Department and 10 U.S.C. 284: Legislative Origins and Funding Questions. CRS Insight. Retrieved March 6, 2024, from https://sgp.fas.org/crs/natsec/IN11052.pdf
[xlvii] Jenkins, B. (2023, March 22). Should Mexico’s Drug Cartels Be Designated Foreign Terrorist Organizations? RAND. https://www.rand.org/pubs/commentary/2023/03/should-mexicos-drug-cartels-be-designated-foreign-terrorist.html