Jama’at Nusrat al-Islam wal-Muslimin (JNIM) has been a growing threat in the west African country of Mali for more than a decade – primarily in north and central Mali. JNIM is an al-Qaeda affiliate group that formed up in March 2017 from four smaller Mali-based extremist groups. JNIM is a Salafi-Jihadist organization that seeks to build a Salafi-Islamist state in West Africa and expel Western influence from the region.
The insurgency in Mali began in 2012 with a Tuareg-led rebellion in northern Mali. The Tuareg movement has been partially hijacked by Islamist groups. The Tuaregs are a traditional nomadic group who resisted French colonial rule for many years. This tribal group living primarily in the Sahara was supported by former Libyan President Moammar Gadhafi who had ambitions of expanding Libya’s influence into the Sahel region of Africa. The Tuaregs had previously revolted in 1963, 1990, and 2006 hoping to achieve autonomy for the desert region they call Azawad. The Tuareg people inhabit the areas of northern Mali, Niger, and parts of western Libya.
Over the past several months the JNIM threat has spread to the west and south of Mali. The capital city of Bamako is facing growing isolation. The greatest impact to Bamako at the moment is economic. JNIM activity has restricted shipments of fuel the past few months to the city causing severe economic hardship. In addition, government army convoys and outposts are increasingly under attack. The European Council on Foreign Relations (ECFR) provides an interactive map that depicts the various Jihadist groups, Tuareg militias, and Russian PMC forces.
Fuel usually arrives by truck from the countries of Guinea, Cote d’Ivoire, Mauritania, and Senegal. However, JNIM is targeting the fuel trucks, setting them ablaze, in an attempt to disrupt economic activity in the capital city. These actions put a strain on the security forces of Mali and diminish the legitimacy of the current Mali government.
The blockade of fuel to the capital city is only one of many tactics employed by JNIM to establish control over areas of Mali. It continues to employ IEDs, drones, raids, assassinations, and ambushes in the fight against government forces. In addition, it demands compliance and support of the civilian population under its control.
A Deteriorating Security Environment
Over the past few years the security situation has grown increasing dire. JNIM and other associated insurgent groups have increased their presence and activities in the south and west of Mali and the Mali security forces have been mostly on the defensive. The country of Mali has a population of about 22 million people (CIA Factsheet). Most of the population lives in the south of the country. The violence has caused many people to flee to other countries – most to Mauritania to the north while some go to Senegal to the east.
In 2021, the military ousted the pro-Western government. The Junta has moved away from support by European nations and some African security organizations in favor of security assistance from Russia. This switch from western and African-led security arrangements to that provided by Russia has not resulted in an improved security environment.
Mali Cut Ties with Security Organizations
In May of 2022 Mali withdrew from the Sahel G5 Alliance. The FC-G5S Sahel Joint Task Force was an attempt (heavily influenced and supported by France) to counter terrorism and transnational organized crime in the Sahel region of Africa. The force consisted of troops from Mali, Burkina Faso, Chad, Niger, and Mauritania and numbered about 5,000 personnel. The United States provided significant funding as well.
Later in 2022 the junta announced the European special operations forces (SOF) belonging to Task Force Takuba would be withdrawing. Several European nations contributed SOF units to this task force to fight the armed insurgent groups in the Sahel. The Takuba task force was under the command of Operation Barkhane – a French led security initiative.
Operation Barkhane also came to a close in 2022. At one time there were about 4,500 French soldiers in the region as part of Operation Barkhane. Established in 2014, the Barkhane force was focused on insurgent activity in the countries of Mali, Burkina Faso, and Niger. The French task force was also assisted by troops from the UK, Estonia, and Denmark.
Mali also rejected the presence of the United Nations Multidimensional Integrated Stabilization Mission in Mali (MINUSMA). The UN force was an international peacekeeping mission that deployed in 2013 to assist in stabilizing the country. At its peak it had about 15,000 military and police personnel from numerous contributing countries. By December 2023 MINUSMA had completely withdrawn from Mali.
In January 2025 the Mali military junta formally withdrew from the Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS). This regional group of 15 West African countries was founded in 1975 to promote economic integration, development, and stability. Mali formed the Alliance of Sahel States along with Burkina Faso and Niger. This is a mutual defense pact to assist members in the event of an attack and is meant to be an alternative to ECOWAS.
Russia Fills the Security Gap
With the departure of Western and African security forces Mali turned to Russia for assistance. Moscow was quite ready to fill the gap left by the previous international security arrangements – providing military support, weapons, and economic assistance. This serves Russia’s goals of countering Western presence in the Sahel region as well as providing access to Mali’s gold, phosphates, kaolin, uranium, gypsum, and other natural resources.
Initially, Russia deployed elements of the Wagner Group – a Russian paramilitary organization or private military company (PMC) to provide security assistance. The PMC occupied several of the posts formerly under French control. The Russian mercenaries assisted in the recapture of some of the northern areas under the control of the insurgents. In 2023 the Wagner Group was replaced by Russia’s Africa Corps – a Russian Ministry of Defense paramilitary organization. However, after some initial success the Russian paramilitary forces have suffered some defeats and have turned to a more defensive posture.
Both JNIM and the Malian Armed Forces (FAMa) have been accused of human rights violations and causing civilian deaths. The Russian Africa Corps is associated with many of these civilian deaths. The civilian casualties have proven to be a recruitment factor for JNIM. The effectiveness of the Russian initiative in Mali has not been the success both the Russians and military junta had hoped for.
A Future Jihadist Government in Mali?
Fuel shortages have resulted in long lines at fueling stations and power outages. JNIM has already established ‘shadow governments’ in areas under their control. In addition, JNIM’s version of Sharia Law has been implemented in areas that they control. Many western nations, including the United States, Britain, and Italy, have advised their citizens to leave Mali due to the ongoing security situation.
The expansion of JNIM and allied violent extremist organizations (VEOs) into southern and western Mali has put a severe strain on Mali’s security forces and the economic sector. While Bamako is the ultimate target JNIM is also gaining control of smaller cities and towns throughout Mali. JNIM may not have to physically seize the capital; it could force the ruling junta into negotiations for a settlement favorable to JNIM. It is conceivable that a coalition could be formed leading to Islamic governance.
This growing security problem is not just a concern to Mali’s current government; other border nations realize the implications of a Jihadist government in Mali. The prospect of the insurgent groups in these bordering countries receiving support and sanctuary from a Jihadist Mali is on the horizon. The countries of Burkina Faso and Niger are especially vulnerable.
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Image: Map derived from an image in Congressional Research Service publication entitled “U.S. Counterterrorism Priorities and Challenges in Africa”, December 2019, page 2, CRS TE10044. The map depicts operating areas of AQIM, JNIM, and affiliates in red and ISIS-Greater Sahara and affiliates in blue.
